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Abstract
Four models are developed and tested in this
study. The first two models deal with arms trade, and
the other two deal with military expenditures. The
most important finding of this study is political
freedom has a very strong effect on both arms trade
and military expenditures in Eastern Europe. The more
free a country, the less likely it is to have high
levels of arms trade overall, as well as import arms.
Also, the higher the level of political freedom, the
lower the value and intensity of military
expenditures.
All of the models were tested for Eastern Europe
a whole as well as for the individual countries of
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland and Romania.
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Question and Significance
The newly elected Bush administration is making
international headlines these days by pushing for the
development of a national missile-defense system. Such
a system, most would agree, is a violation of the 1972
anti-ballistic missile treaty signed between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Opponents of the
shield argue its development could lead to a new arms
race and send military expenditures spiraling out of
control.
A recent report entitled "Recent Trends in
Military Expenditure" published by the Stockholm
International Peach Research Institute (SIPRI) reports
that military expenditures are once again increasing
after a 10-year period of decline

(2001).

This

increase in military expenditures began in 1999 and
continued into 2000. It, is important to note this
increase is not restricted to certain regions of the
world, rather every region has seen an increase in
military expenditures since 1999.
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Thus far, trade in arms does not seem to be
following suit. In a separate report, Recent Trends in
Arms Production, SIPRI notes that arms trade has been
on the decline since 1989 (2001). For example, in
1970, arms imports as a percentage of total imports
was 2.1 for all of the Warsaw Pact countries. The
percentage of total exports made up of arms exports
during that same time was 5.7. In 1994 the percentage
of arms imports was down to 0.2 and the export
percentage was down to 1.4.
The year 198 9 was a very significant one in the
international politics and economics. The fall of the
Berlin wall and the rapid disintegration of communist
governments in Eastern Europe brought about many
significant changes in the international community.
Whereas the communist governments generally
restricted trade in Eastern Europe to trade amongst
communist countries, the new democratic governments
pushed for increasingly open trade with all countries.
As a result, overall trade volumes in Eastern Europe
have been increasing as has the ratio of traded goods
to GDP, commonly referred to as openness to trade.
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As one can imagine, the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe has sparked a number of questions about
the future of global economics and politics. Many have
studied the region's emerging trade patterns in areas
such as agriculture, manufacturing and services. There
has been some research done on the changes in arms
trade; however, most of the research was done soon
after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This study
will explore the changing trade patterns in military
expenditures and arms trade that have emerged since
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.
Two main questions will be addressed in this
paper. The first question is "what factors influence
arms trade in Eastern Europe?"

This question can be

broken down into two separate sub-questions.

The

first being "what variables appear to affect the
overall volume of arms traded in Eastern Europe?" The
overall volume of arms trade is defined as the total
dollar value of arms imports and exports in each of
the Eastern European countries.
Realizing that all trade, including arms trade,
is a two-way process, the second part of this question
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asks, "what factors influence whether a country is a
net importer or exporter of arms?" This is essentially
defined as the difference between the dollar value of
arms imported by these countries from the dollar value
of arms exported.
The second question is, "what factors influence
military expenditures in Eastern Europe?"

This

question can also be broken down into two separate
parts. The first is "what factors have influenced the
overall volume of military expenditures in Eastern
Europe over time?" The volume of military expenditures
is defined as the total dollar value of military
expenditures spent by the governments of the Eastern
European countries.
The second part is "what factors influence the
intensity of military expenditures in Eastern Europe
over time?"

The intensity of military expenditures is

defined as the ratio of the dollar value of military
expenditures to the dollar value of GDP in those same
countries.
The answers to these questions are significant
for many reasons.

Beginning with the second question,
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many in the international community consider a
reduction in the amount of money spent on military
items an important policy goal. Former President
Eisenhower once said, "Every rifle being made, every
launched naval vessel and every fired missile.is after
all theft of the people who are hungry and not fed,
who are cold and not clothed"

(Broek 1998). While not

all would agree with this statement, it is at least
partially true. A government only has so much in
resources to work with; if more of this money is
allocated to military expenditures,

it only follows

that less money is available for other projects that
may be of importance including welfare programs,
education, and health care programs.
If we can learn what factors are conducive to an
increase in the overall volume of military
expenditures, we may be able to take measures to
lessen or even eliminate the presence of those
factors. Directly related to this,, if we can learn
what factors are conducive to a decline in military
expenditures, we may be able to take measures to
promote the existence of those factors.
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While many may consider a reduction in military
expenditures as a step in the right direction, perhaps
another equally, if not more, important goal is
reducing the emphasis placed on military expenditures
within an economy. As GDP increases, it would not be
surprising to see all components of GDP to rise also,
including military expenditures by the central
government. What is also important to analyze is
whether the growth in military expenditures is
outpacing the growth in GDP.

A good way to look at

this is to see how the ratio of military expenditures
to GDP changes over time.
Looking at what factors influence the volume and
intensity of military expenditures may be important;
however, a subset of this is arms trade. The volume of
arms trade is also an important statistic.

It may

provide us an idea of what countries are expecting to
need, and perhaps use, weapons. Related to this, it is
important to note whether a country is a net importer
or a net exporter of weapons.
If a country has decided to export weapons this
could be a signal that the government of that
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particular country does not foresee the need to be
using those arms in the near future, either for
offensive or defensive purposes,

so they are being

shipped out of the country. This is assuming, of
course, the traded arms were not produced for trade.
Granted, this may not always be the case.
Sometimes a net surplus of weapons exports may simply
mean that domestic arms production is greater than
domestic arms consumption.

In the case of Eastern

Europe, the production of small arms for trade is on
the increase (United Nations 2000) .
If a country is also decreasing the total value
involved in arms trade, this could also be an
indication that governments are expecting a more
peaceful future. This could be a positive sign,
signaling a more peaceful period in the region.
Granted, it could also mean that competition is
greater in the weapons industry.
Conversely, if a country begins to import weapons
on a larger scale or begins to devote more resources
to a higher percentage of arms trade, these could be
signals that the government of that country is

expecting to need more arms. This could be, perhaps,
in response to a perceived external threat, thus
prompting the need for more defense mechanisms, or it
could be an indication the government plans to launch
its own offensive maneuvers.
Once again, this may not always be an accurate
interpretation of the situation. Perhaps domestic
production of arms was reduced or even eliminated for
some reason; this could be a plausible explanation for
an increase in arms imports over arms exports.
However, since the volume of domestic arms production
in Eastern European countries has changed very little
over time, it is more likely that an increase in arms
imports, may be the signal of a heightening arms race.
For example, if a threat is suddenly perceived, a
government may not have the time necessary to step-up
domestic arms production. Instead, the government may
decide to import arms from other countries in order to
compete in the arms race.
Predicting whether a country is likely to be a
net importer or a net exporter of weapons in the
coming years can be a useful tool in determining
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whether the near future of a particular region will
tend to be more peaceful and stable, or more
confrontational and unstable.
1.2 Background
There are a number of reasons why the region of
Eastern Europe is an important area to study regarding
these issues.

First of all, these countries

(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland and Romania) were once part of the "Iron
Curtain" that was installed by the Soviet Union to
help guard against an invasion of the USSR by Western
forces.

These countries were not actually part of the

former USSR, however their economic and political
structures were designed to closely mirror those of
the Soviet Union.
For example, all of these countries operated
under some form of a centrally planned economic
system, rather than a free-market based economy.

All

of the countries in question also were under the
influence of a government operating under a communist
philosophy of governance.

These countries were also

once part of a common agreement called the Warsaw
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Pact.

The Warsaw Pact of 1955 was primarily an

agreement meant to protect and strengthen the
Communist philosophy, however some military purposes
were also served by the pact

(Mastny 2001).

Similarities in the economic and political
infrastructure of these countries is desirable, as it
will help to minimize potential noise in the data.
When working with data, an assumption of ceteris
paribus, meaning all else being equal, is made. The
more similarities there are between the countries from
which the data is collected, the more likely the
assumption of ceteris paribus is to be true.
Former Iron Curtain countries are also important
to study, as they have been more successful in
creating stable democratic states and freer economic
systems than have their former Soviet counterparts,
with the exception of the Baltic states.

If these

countries are more likely to continue to build upon
their newly established political and economic
systems, the results of this study will be more
relevant than if the states reverted back to their
Soviet-style past.
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This is because the results of this paper are
intended to identify what factors are conducive to a
reduction in arms trade and military expenditures;
traits which are normally associated with nonCommunist regimes, of course the US and France are
notable exceptions.
Previously, it has been thought that Eastern
Europe was not a desirable region for serious
statistical study due in part to the difficulty of
obtaining reliable data.

This thought has changed in

recent years, with the opening of data archives and
other valuable research materials to the rest of the
academic world (King 2000).

Also, records from

Eastern Europe tend to be more easily accessible and
reliable than data for the former Soviet states.
2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Gravity Model
The empirical framework behind one of the models
is the gravity model of trade.

The gravity model is

used to predict the volume of international trade.
The basic structure of the gravity model uses trade
volume as the dependent variable and incorporates the
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trading partners' GDP, geographic proximity, and
general barriers to trade (Bergstrand 1985).
The gravity model has been a part of economic
thought for many years now. Tingbergen first applied
this model in a 1962 paper, followed by Poyhonen in
1963.
Despite the wide use of the gravity model, some
have criticized the model for lack of a strong
theoretical foundation. Studies by Anderson

(197 9) and

Bergstrand (1985)have concluded there are no inherent
problems with the model and also have provided a
microeconomic foundation for the model. A later study
by Deardorff

(1995) has also strengthened the

credibility of the model by showing it is consistent
with both the neoclassical and Ricardian traditions.
Since then, many economists have incorporated the
gravity models in their studies. One of these
economists is Kalirajan (1999). Kalirajan uses data
for Australia and its trade partners during the years
1990 through 1994 to analyze trade relationships with
countries on the Indian Ocean Rim. Kalirajan uses the
gravity model to estimate potential trade and
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concludes that those countries with fewer trade
restrictions were better able to capitalize on their
trade potential.
Wang and Winters

(1992)also use the gravity model

to predict overall trade in Eastern Europe using data
from 1989 to 1992. The authors conclude the increased
openness to trade that is emerging in Eastern Europe
will not significantly affect trade between Eastern
Europe and developing countries, but should
significantly increase trade with industrialized
countries such as the US.
One economist who does look at the application of
the gravity model to Eastern Europe is Nagy (1997).
Similar to Wang and Winters, Nagy also use data since
the collapse of communism in 1989 through 1995. Nagy
concludes the gravity model is indeed a reliable
predictor of trade in Eastern Europe.
Summary (1989) also uses the gravity theory to
analyze US bilateral trade. Summary runs two separate
regressions to see what factors have the greatest
effects upon US imports and exports. Summary concludes
there are many political factors that influence trade
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in addition to the commonly accepted economic factors.
Interestingly, one of these political factors is arms
transfers. Summary found that arms transfers are
highly significant in determining import and export
volume in an economy.

This study is similar to

Summary's in that I also believe that political
factors as well as economic ones have an impact upon
arms trade and military expenditures.
The encouraging results of the many studies done
using the gravity model in predicting overall levels
of trade have prompted me to see if the theory can be
applied to a specific subset of trade, arms trade.
There has been a great deal of research on and use of
the gravity model, however there seems to be an
absence of research applying the gravity model of
trade to specific subsets of trade.

More

specifically, there does not seem to be any academic
literature relating arms trade and the gravity model.
There is a rather large body of literature
dealing with issues of arms trade in general, and the
economic implications and foundations of it. Some of
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the research that has been conducted on the issue of
arms trade is summarized in the following section.
2 .2 Arms Trade
The recent international debate over the United
States' proposed missile defense system has once again
brought the issue of arms trade to the forefront of
policy debate. Many argue that if such a system is
developed by the United States, a new arms race may
result.
Of course, the debate over arms trade and its
impact is nothing new. Li and Mirmirani

(1998) analyze

the effects trading military and arms technology has
on economic growth.

The findings of Li and Mirmirani

indicate there is a fairly strong negative correlation
between those two variables.
The fact that Li and Mirmirani have found a
correlation between economic growth and arms trade
implies that arms trade may be something controllable.
Therefore, if we can determine what factors influence
arms trade, we may be able to manipulate those factors
in order to reduce the volume of arms trade in the
world.
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Mussington (1994) has done a great deal of
research on the supply side issues of arms trade, and
he also finds that controllable variables do, in fact,
influence arms trade. Among Mussington's findings is
that government actions, such as taxation, influence
arms trade by affecting how much resources are
available for the trading of arms.
Harkavy (1994) analyzes three recent historical
eras with distinctly different international systems.
These periods are the interwar period (between World
Wars I and II), the Cold War period, and the post-Cold
War period.

Harkavy found the post-Cold War period

does share many similarities with the interwar period.
In both of those eras, Harkavy argues arms trade has
become de-politicized and de-nationalized.
Brzoska and Pearson (1994) also note that the
United States' current position as the sole remaining
military superpower has a definite impact on the arms
trade. Taking a supply-side perspective, Brzoska and
Pearson note the United States is likely to remain the
leading arms supplier, due in part to the political
and economic uncertainties that exist in Russia. While
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this article was written in 1994, the conclusions are
arguably still true today, as economic and political
uncertainties are still prevalent in Russia.
Catrina

(1994) argues that arms transfers should

be the central theme of research on arms in this new
era.

Catrina argues for a more descriptive approach

to analyzing the changing system of arms transfers, as
opposed to a more statistical one. Part of his
rationale behind this is the lack of reliable
statistical information available. While this may have
been a valid argument in 1994, vast strides have been
made to make reliable data from Eastern Europe more
easily obtained.
The arguments made by Harkavy, Brzoska and
Pearson, and Catrina lend support to the argument that
economic factors may be more influential in arms trade
than in the past. Whereas arms trade used to be almost
exclusively a political issue, more and more economic
factors are being introduced in arms trade models,
replacing or complementing political ones.
Many studies have been done on Russia's arms
trade, including two studies by Khripunov. The first
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study, published in 1994, noted that there would
likely be some major changes in the arms trade game in
Russia since democracy and capitalism have taken hold.
Khripunov (1999) noted that the Cold War was the
primary motivation for Russia to export arms during
that time. Now that the Cold War is over, Russia does
not have to export weapons in order to protect its
national interests. Khripunov also notes that Russian
economic policy makers have recently decided to export
weapons in order to boost a failing economy.
Khrutsky and Latypov (1997) also look at arms
trade in Russia, noting that the future of the Russian
defense industry is, at best, uncertain. Berryman
looks at the role of the black market in Russia's arms
trade game

(2000). Very few authors have focused on

Eastern Europe's arms trade.
If one is concerned with the military activity in
a particular county, region, or in the world overall,
it is reasonable to want to be aware not only of
issues related to arms trade, but also to a more broad
issue: military expenditures.

While arms trade has

seemed to receive the bulk of academic attention,

19

there does exist some valuable work on military
expenditures.
2.3 Military Expenditures
Broek (1998) and Kempster

(1998) have both

presented research on the impact of peace movements on
military expenditures. Both of these authors, in two
separate studies, have concluded that the stronger the
peace movement in a country, the lower the military
expenditures.
Other economists have examined military
expenditures in certain countries. Thomas Scheetz
(1996) analyzed 1969-1995 data from Guatemala and
concluded that military expenditures have a negative
effect on GDP growth. One of the reasons Scheetz
believes this relationship holds is that military
expenditures in Guatemala monopolized scarce resources
which were unavailable for use in productive economic
sectors.
Sezgin (1998) analyzes military expenditures in
Turkey during the years 1956 through 1994. In the case
of Turkey, Sezgin concludes that military expenditures
are conducive to economic growth; and the major
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determinants of military expenditures are GDP, civil
strife, and the military expenditures of rival Greece.
In addition to individual sets of authors, there
are also international organizations that specialize
in the analysis of military expenditures. One of these
organizations is the Ottawa Symposium. The theme of
this symposium was "Military Expenditure in Developing
Countries: Security and Development."

Four different

regions of the world were discussed in this symposium:
South Asia, Southern Africa, Central America, and the
Horn of Africa.

There was no work presented on

Eastern Europe or the Newly Independent States

(NIS).

One of the purposes of this study is to help fill this
noticeable lack of research on military expenditures
in Eastern Europe.
In sum, previous research has shown that both
political and economic factors influence arms trade
and military expenditures. Very little research has
been done on arms trade and military expenditures
Eastern Europe exclusively, a fact this paper intends
to help change.
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3.0 Empirical Models and Data
3.1 Model A
The first model will be developed in order to
predict the overall volume of arms trade in Eastern
Europe and will be referred to as Model A. The volume
of arms trade is defined as the total dollar value of
arms imports and^exports in the region. The data for
exports were obtained from two sources: the U.S. State
Department's publication World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers

(WMEAT) , and various issues of the

CIA World Factbook.
A gravity-like model will be the operational
theory on which this model is based. In most cases,
the gravity model is used to explain the exports of
one country to another and is a function of each
country's economic and geo-political traits. Due to
data limitations, I have modified the theory from its
conventional use to analyze broad trade patterns to a
more refined use in analyzing arms trade.
Model A will be defined as:
•TTRADE-po+PiLNGDP+p2LNOPEN Ip3LNPFI+p4LNMILES+|l
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The dependent variable for this model is the total
trade in arms in Eastern Europe

(TTRADE). Model A has

four explanatory variables: GDP, distance from Moscow
prior to the collapse of the USSR or from Brussels
after the collapse (MILES) openness to trade (OPEN)
and a political freedom index (PFI). Where possible,
logs of the above variables were used and are
indicated by an "LN" in front of each variable name.
The models were also estimated including dummy
variables for time, such as DUM70 for the year 1970,
DUM71 for 1971, etc. However, the dummy variables were
not included in the country-specific regressions.
The estimations for Eastern Europe as a whole are
presented in addition to the estimations for all six
countries included in the study. For Eastern Europe,
the number of observations is 164. There are seven
different countries that are included in the data,
with the years ranging from 1970-1997. More recent
data was not available for arms trade.
In sum, Model A is not a true gravity model, as
it does not use the trade between two countries as the
dependent variable, but rather the total arms trade of
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the entire region. However, I have incorporated some
of the explanatory variables normally associated with
the gravity model into model A. Both nominal GDP of
the trading countries and geographic distances are
explanatory variables that can be found in traditional
gravity models and model A.
Upon analysis of the data, I expect to find a
positive correlation between the level of arms trade
and GDP. In other words, I expect the volume of arms
trade will increase as GDP increases. Many of the
previously mentioned studies have found a positive
correlation between the volume of trade between
countries and their GDPs.

I do not expect this

relationship to hold up for arms trade, at least not
in Eastern Europe. As was mentioned in the SIPRI
article, arms trade has been on the decline since the
late 1980s, while GDPs have been on the rise.
The data for each country's GDP was also obtained
from various issues of WMEAT and the CIA World
Factbook. The data was from various years and needed
to be adjusted for inflation. This was accomplished
using the GDP deflator provided on w w w .dismal.com.
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The gravity model hypothesizes the closer the
economic centers of countries are to one another, the
higher the volume of trade will be between those
countries. For Model A, this will be modified to
account for the distances between centers of military
power. During the existence of the USSR, the distance
between each country's capital and Moscow will be
factored into the model. After the dissolution of the
USSR, distance from Moscow will be replaced with
distance from Brussels, signifying a shift in
influence from the USSR to NATO.
Based on the rationale behind the Warsaw Pact, I
expect to find a positive correlation between the
r

volume of arms trade and distance. The Warsaw Pact was
intended primarily to promote the communist
philosophy, however a secondary purpose was military
in nature

(Mastny 2001). Military strategy would

dictate that the strongest, most reinforced areas
should be in place around the target one most wants to
preserve. Therefore, those countries closer to Moscow
would likely be more heavily armed than those further
away. It is important to note, however, that not all
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of the members of the Warsaw Pact followed Moscow's
military directives with the same level of obedience.
Romania especially did not follow these directives
(Bacon 2001).
I expect the positive correlation to hold true
when distance from Brussels is substituted for
distance from Moscow. True, Brussels would want to
have more concentrated arms nearby rather than afar,
but since Belgium is not the primary weapons trade
partner of Eastern European countries,

I do not expect

the relationship to be quite as strong.
A third explanatory variable included in model A
is openness to trade. For the purposes of this study,
openness to trade is defined as the dollar value of
exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Most of
these values were obtained from the Penn World Tables,
however more recent data

(1993-1999) was calculated by

myself using data provided in Nations in Transit 19992000: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East
Central Europe and the Newly Independent States.
Openness to trade is an important variable
because it may be an indicator of how incorporated a
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country is in the growing global economic and
political systems. The more integrated a country is,
the more leverage the international community has to
encourage or discourage certain behaviors by that
country.

For example, if a country is highly

incorporated in the international system, it is more
likely to submit to arms reductions treaties in order
to maintain favorable standing in the economic
community.

In other words, there may be a negative

correlation between arms trade and openness to trade.
On the other hand, a positive correlation between
openness and arms trade is possible. Part of the
reasoning behind this is the arms trading partners of
Eastern Europe tend to be more industrialized
countries rather than developing countries, and that
is the situation where Wang and Winters

(1991) found a

positive correlation between openness and total trade.
If a country is more open to trade, it is rational to
expect the volume of trade to increase

(Kalirajan

1999).
Wall

(1999) looks at the various trade barriers

the United States has erected against various
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countries in the rest of the world including import
policies, administrative barriers, government
procurement, intellectual property and other barriers
to trade.

Wall looks at these barriers both

collectively and separately to see what effects those
barriers have on US imports and exports. He concludes
that barriers to trade do indeed decrease the overall
level of trade.
A final explanatory variable included in model A
is political freedom. Research by both Kempster (1998)
and Broek (1998) support the claim that the peace
movement affects military expenditures and arms trade.
The peace movement is likely to be stronger in
countries with greater political freedom, as more
repressive countries are more likely to squash peace
movements. The values for political freedom are taken
from an index published in Nations in Transit 19992000. The values range from one, which represents the
highest level of political rights and civil liberties,
to seven, which represents the lowest possible level.
The data used in the regression will be the index
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values for all of the countries analyzed over all of
the years in question.
One of the many questions I intend to answer with
this study is how communist-style regimes influence
arms trade and military expenditures. I have
introduced political freedom as a proxy for Communism
in all of the models developed in this study. Some of
the countries involved in this study, such as Romania,
still tend to have a rather sizeable post-communist
influence, while others, like Poland, do not.
Whether there is a positive or negative
correlation between political freedom and openness to
trade remains to be seen. It is possible that the more
repressive a regime, the higher the level of arms
trade and military expenditures, as in the cases of
China and the former Soviet Union. On the other hand,
countries such as Great Britain and the United States
are arguably quite free, but still have comparatively
high levels of arms trade and military expenditures.
Also, the studies by Broek (1998) and Kempster

(1998)

support the hypothesis that more political freedom
will lead to less military expenditures.
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3.2 Model B
Model B is similar to model A in that it looks at
an aspect of arms trade. Whereas model A is developed
to predict the overall level of arms trade in Eastern
Europe, model B is developed to predict whether or not
the region will be a net importer or a net exporter of
arms. The data for this dependent variable were
obtained from various WMEAT publications and from the
CIA World Factbook.
Model B is specified as follows:
BOT=p0+PiGDPGR+p2LNOPEN+p3LNPFI+jJ.
The dependent variable in this model is the balance of
arms trade

(BOT) as defined by arms exports minus arms

imports. There are three independent variables, the
growth rate of real GDP (GDPGR), openness to trade
(OPEN) and political freedom (PFI). po is the constant
term and

jj, is

the error term.

The first explanatory variable used in model B is
the growth rate of GDP. Li and Mirmirani

(1998)

analyze the effects trading military and arms
technology has on economic growth.

The findings of

Mirmirani and Li indicate there is a correlation
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between those two variables.

I have incorporated the

growth rate of GDP in model B due in

part to

the

findings of Li and Mirmirani.
I expect to find a positive correlation between
an arms trade surplus, meaning that exports exceed
imports, and economic growth. Once an economy begins
to grow, policy makers are likely to

want to

that growth. One of the ways that GDP can

sustain

increase is

if exports are greater than imports, or even if a
trade deficit begins to shrink. An exception to this
general rule is the United States. Exporting weapons
can help sustain economic growth. Therefore, I expect
to find a positive correlation between the growth rate
of GDP and

an arms trade surplus.

Not everyone subscribes to this hypothesis.
Khripunov (1999) notes that the Russian economic
policy makers have recently decided to export weapons
in order to boost a failing economy. However, Russia
is not Eastern Europe.

For the most part, Eastern

Europe has

enjoyed much more prosperous times than

Russia and

the former Soviet states. Also, this may

be
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a temporary action by Russia in desperate times,
however we cannot be sure.
Khripunov himself noted this is a temporary
phenomenon and that Russia's primary motivation for
being a net exporter of weapons

(to protect and spread

Soviet style communism) has disappeared. Governments
who operated countries under this ideology tended to
squelch free trade and political freedoms.
As the need for arms declines in the region, countries
are faced with a surplus of weapons for which Eastern
European leaders may not see a need.
With this in mind, I expect to see countries
become net exporters of as economies begin to grow, as
markets begin to open, and as political freedoms begin
to blossom. Therefore I have included openness to
trade and political freedom as explanatory variables
in model B.
3.3 Model C
The dependent variable in model C is the total
dollar value of military expenditures in Eastern
Europe. These values were once again obtained using
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the WMEAT publications as well as the CIA World
Factbook. Model C is specified as:
ME=po+PiGDPGR+p2LNOPEN+p 3 LNPFI+p4LNNATO+jLi
where Po is the constant term and p. is the error term.
The dependent variable in this model is total military
expenditures

(LNME). Three of the explanatory

variables have been used in previous models: growth
rate of real GDP (GDPGR), political freedom (PFI) and
openness to trade

(OPEN). A fourth variable is

introduced in this model, affiliation with NATO
(NATO). Once again, the model was tested both with and
without dummy variables for time when estimated for
Eastern Europe as a whole.
For the most part, the same variables that
influence arms trade should also have an influence on
military expenditures.

Military expenditures is

defined by NATO as capital expenditures on:
(a)

The armed forces, including
peacekeeping forces;

(b)

Defense ministries and other government
agencies engaged in defense projects;
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(c)

(d)

Paramilitary

forces, when

trained and

equipped for

military operations;

Military space activities

Civil defense, veterans' benefits,
demobilization, conversion and weapons destruction are
not included in the figures
This

(SIPRI 2001, "Sources...) .

definition of military expenditures

is used in

compiling the data in both the WMEAT and SIPRI
publications.
Investment in arms is one aspect of military
expenditures, albeit a more specialized subset.
Therefore many of the same economic and political
variables that have been found to be important factors
in the arms trade will also be important with regard
to military expenditures as a whole. As a result, many
of the same variables will be incorporated into the
models of arms trade and military expenditures that I
have devised and tested in this study.
The growth rate of real GDP will be included as
an explanatory variable. The 1997 Ottawa Symposium on
Military Expenditures and Growth presented evidence
supporting theories that claim military expenditures
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and development are indeed correlated. If these
variables are related in areas of the world such as
South Asia, Central America and Africa, it is
reasonable to see if the relationships also apply in
Eastern Europe.
Political freedom will also be included as an
explanatory variable in model C. The primary purpose
of the Iron Curtain was to act as a shield against
Western socio-political penetration into the Soviet
sphere of influence [specifically the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)]. With this in mind, it is
rational to expect these countries would need to have
a higher level of military expenditures and arms in
order to serve the purpose of defending the Soviet
Union and the overall communist philosophy.
As communism and the USSR decline,

so do the odds

that Western forces will attempt to invade. With this
understood, there is less need for the Eastern
European countries to be armed; therefore, military
expenditures should decline during this time. These
hypotheses are based, in part, on the findings of
Khripunov (1994, 1999).
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As was mentioned earlier, openness to trade can
also be used as a proxy for communist influence,
therefore I have again incorporated openness to trade
as an explanatory variable. I expect to find a
negative relationship between military expenditures
and openness to trade.
In order more fully capture the impact of
communism on military expenditures,

I have included a

variable for affiliation with NATO in both models C
and D. As membership or partnership with NATO
increases among Eastern European countries, the value
and intensity of military expenditures should
increase. Eastern European countries join NATO, there
is less of a threat of military aggression against
these countries so there is less of a need for an arms
stockpile, however NATO does stipulate that members
increase their military expenditures to a certain
level. Partners do not necessarily have to increase
the levels as much as full-fledged members
(www.nato.org) . Should any of these, countries become a
victim of external aggression, other members of NATO
are obliged to come to the assistance of the
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victimized country. As a result, there is little
incentive to increase military expenditures beyond the
levels, dictated by NATO.
3.4 Model D
Model D is very similar to model C, except the
dependent variable is a measure of the intensity of
military expenditures. In other words, it is the ratio
-of the dollar value of military expenditures to GDP.
Once again the data come from WMEAT publications and
the CIA World Factbook.

Model D is specified as:

INTENSE=p0+PiGDPGR+p2LNOPEN+p3LNPFI+H
The dependent variable is intensity of military
expenditures

(INTENSE), measured as military

expenditures as a proportion of GDP, and the other
variables are the same as before: growth rate of GDP
(GDPGR), log of openness to trade

(LNOPEN), and the

log of political freedom (LNPFI). Again, Po is the
constant term and |j, is the error term.
While the sheer volume of resources spent on
military expenditures is an important figure to look
at when studying the military situation of a country,
it is also important to take into consideration the
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intensity of military expenditures. For example,
country A may have a significantly higher level of
military expenditures than country B, but if country A
also has a significantly higher GDP than country B,
perhaps the two aren't all that dissimilar in
relationship to each other's expenditures. The
intensity variable is useful in comparing countries
and regions of the world.
The explanatory variables for model D will be the
same as in model C, using the same hypotheses. Once
again those variables are the growth rate of real GDP,
political freedom, openness to trade, and affiliation
with NATO.
4.0 Empirical Results
All of the models were estimated using ordinary
least squares regression analysis. The models were
tested for the region as a whole, as well as for each
of the selected countries to see if any patterns found
hold up. For the regional regressions, the models were
tested using dummy variables to control for the
passing of time on the data.

The statistics provided on Table 1 are only for
the region as a whole, and not for the individual
countries.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
MEAN
REGIONAL
TTRADE
BOT
ME
INTENSE
GDP
GDPGR
PFI
OPEN
MILES
NATO

299.39
-34.40
8189.10
5.77
134297.90
-0.47
2.49
74.64
813.89
1.05

MINIMUM
10.00
-1422.10
332.00
1.80
348142.00
-17.5
1
29.79
448
0

MAXIMUM
9487.00
8692.80
20000.00
15.70
17550.00
10.6
7
310.70
1107
2

STD DEVIATION
1027.03
223.49
1708.23
0.94
1203.11
5.79
1.34
89.50
60.14
0.54

4.1 Model A
Table 2: Model A: Dependent Variable TTRADE
E.
Region** Region*** Bulgaria Czechs. Germ. Hungary Poland Romania
0.84*
LNGDP
0.74*
0.78*
1.87*
0.66
0.99*
1.23
0.78*
(3-49)
(5.95)
(4.21) (1.27)
(1.42)
(1.37)
(3.50) (0.04)
LNOPEN
0.32
0.87*
1.05*
0.38
0.43
0.68
0.18
0.05
(0.58)
(4.34)
(1.60)
(0.88) (0.78)
(0.68) (0.33)
(0.00)
LNPFI
0.71*
0.31
0.89 -0.02
1.30*
-0.05
0.27
-0.18
0.54 (0.68)
(2.13)
(7.43)
(-0.04)
(0.53) (-0.34)
(-0.67)
LNMILES
0.41
-1.13*
41.3*
1.54* 25.60* 13.90* 17.90*
38.5
(0.7)
(1.62)
(-2.82)
(1.86)
(2.1)
(1.41) (-1.32)
(1.2)
C
-7.24*
-7.96*
-288*
-14.3* -5.41* -23.70* -16.90*
-65.9*
(-1.47)
(-2.27)
(-1.48)
(-1.32)
(-2.63) (-1.57) (-1.69) (-3.41)
Adj. R2
0.64
0.77
0.56
0.82
0.65
0.62
0.63
0.72
t-statistics are presented in parenthesis
* denotes significance at the 0.80 level or better
** regional results with dummies
***results without dummies
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Table 2 presents the numerical regression results
for model A. The model was tested for the region as a
whole with and without the dummy variables. None of
the dummy variables tested were statistically
significant, therefore the discussion of model A that
follows is based off of regression results where the
dummy variables were omitted.
The estimated model for the Eastern European
region as a whole appears to be fairly solid. An
adjusted R2 value is often used as a measure of
"goodness of fit." The model has an adjusted R2 of
0.62, which implies the variance in the independent
variables account for about 62% of. the variance in the
dependent variable. As for the individual countries,
all of them had adjusted R2 values indicating they
explain over half the variance in total arms trade.
East Germany's estimated model had the lowest,R2
value, 0.56, while Poland has the highest,

0.82.

Adjusted R2 values alone are not enough to
determine the significance of an estimated model. It
is important to look at the F statistic as well. To
accept this model with a 95% confidence level, the
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estimated F statistic for the regional model must be
greater than the critical F statistic of 3.48. The
actual F statistic for the regional model is 52.7. For
the individual country models, the critical value is
4.18, and all of the country models have F statistics
that exceed this value.
Both the adjusted R2 values and the F
statistics for the estimates of model A are
encouraging. However, sometimes data similar to the
data used in these models suffer from a problem of
serial correlation, meaning the error terms are
related. A way to judge if serial correlation is a
problem is to look at the Durbin-Watson

(DW)

statistic. For the regionally estimated model, the DW
statistic would need to be greater than 1.7 6 in order
to reject serial correlation as a problem with 95%
confidence. The actual DW statistic is 1.99. For the
country-specific estimates, the DW statistics would
also need to be above 1.7 6 for the same degree of
confidence. East Germany's estimated model is the only
one where serial correlation can be rejected, however
in all of the other country-specific models, the DW

41

statistics are all greater than 1.08, which puts them
into the "inconclusive" range.
Turning now to the individual independent
variables, it is important first to look at the tstatistics to determine which, if any, of the
independent variables are statistically significant.
For variables to be considered statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level in the
regional model, they must have a t-statistic greater
than 1.96. A t-statistic^greater than 1.28 would be an
indication of significance at the 80% confidence
level.

The critical t-statistics for the country-

specific estimates are 2.04 and 1.31 for 95% and 80%
confidence levels, respectively.
When model A is estimated for the region as a
whole, all of the estimated coefficients are
statistically significant at the 95% level of
confidence. However, this is not the case when model A
is estimated for individual countries.
The coefficients on GDP and distance are the two
which seem to be the most significant in individual
countries. The coefficients on GDP are significant at
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the 95% confidence level for Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, and at the 80% level for Bulgaria and
Romania. The results of all of the regressions suggest
there is a positive relationship between total arms
trade and GDP. However this correlation is not
significant in East Germany or Poland. The magnitude
of the estimated coefficients also varies between the
region and the individual countries.
suggest as GDP increases,

The results

so will the level of arms

trade, at least for the region as a whole and for a
few of the individual countries.
The same is true for openness to trade. All of
the regression results suggest a positive correlation
between total arms trade and openness. The
coefficients are most significant for the region as a
whole, but are significant at the 80% level in
Bulgaria. For the region as a whole, and for Bulgaria,
the regression results suggest that as openness
increases,

so does total arms trade. This is to be

expected, as arms trade is one component of total
trade. If a country or region is more open to trade
and increase imports and exports, it is rational to
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expect that most sectors of trade would increase as
well. The important thing to note is the coefficient
is 0.87, which indicates while increased openness to
trade may lead to an increase arms trade, the impact
is not that great.
Political freedom is only significant for Eastern
Europe as a whole, however the estimated coefficient
has the highest t-statistic of all of the estimated
coefficients in the model. At first glance, it appears
there is a positive correlation between arms trade and
political freedom, which is contrary to my
expectations. In fact, there really is a negative
relationship between these variables, as the values
for PFI range from 7 (least free) to 1 (most free), so
the higher the value, the less free. Once again,
however, it is important to note the relationship is
only significant for Eastern Europe as a whole.
Finally, the results of the regression suggest a
positive correlation between distance and arms trade
for the individual countries, all of the country
coefficients are significant at the 80% level.
Surprisingly, though, the results of the regional
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regression suggest a negative correlation between
distance and arms trade. A possible explanation for
these results is that the more removed the region is
from the military power at the time, the less arms
trade that region will have. However, the countries
that are closer to the military center would need less
arms trade, as they can rely on the close proximity to
the power center for military protection.
The coefficient for distance is actually the
variable's elasticity. The coefficients are quite
large which suggests that arms trade is very sensitive
to distance.
While model A seems to provide a fairly
significant model for determining the overall size of
arms trade for the region as a whole, the following
model will help to determine what factors predict if a
country or region will be a net exporter or importer
of arms.
4.2 Model B
Once again, the model was tested with and without
dummy variables for time using regional data. The
dummy variables do change the results of the

regressions. The results presented on Table 3 do not
include the coefficients for the dummy variables,
however those coefficients are available in the
appendix. The following discussion is based on the
regression results where the dummy variables were
omitted, as they were not statistically significant.
Table 3: Model B : Dependent Variable BOT
E.
Region** Region*** Bulgaria Czechs. Germ. Hungary Poland Romania
GDPGR
-49.00*
49.10*
15.10 -30.20* 21.00* -42.30* -33.10
19.20
(-2.68)
(1.34) (-2.41) (-1.17)
(0.81)
(-1.60)
(3.39)
(0.99)
LNOPEN
-4.66*
-4.22*
-17.60
18.80 -23.40
11.60 13.50
-17.30
(-2.47)
(-2.15)
(-0.05)
(0.79) (-0.12)
(0.95) (0.84)
(0.05)
LNPFI
110.10*
43.40* -431.00* 456.00 -304.00* -321.00* 227.00*
58.60
(2.29)
(1.30)
(3.95) (-2.51) (-1.71) (1.46)
(-1.35)
(0.71)
C
255.10
149.20
524.00 962.00* 947.00 121.00 875.00 367.00
(0.88)
(0.65)
(0.29)
(1.00)
(0.67) (0.58)
(0.75)
(0.98)
Adj. R2
0.59
0.56
0.63
0.54
0.57
0.54
0.67
0.55
t-stati sties are presented in parenthesis
* denotes significance at the 0.80 level or better
** regional results with dummies
***results without dummies

When applied to the region as a whole, model B
has an adjusted R2 value of 0.56, meaning that roughly
56% of the variance in the balance of arms trade can
be explained by the model. In order for the model to
be statistically significant at the 95% confidence
level, the F statistic would need to be greater than
2.68. The estimated F statistic for the model as
applied to Eastern Europe as a whole is 4.2. Finally,
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the regional model has a DW statistic of 1.49, which
indicates serial correlation may be a problem.
For the individual countries, the models statistics
are also rather promising, with all having significant
t-statistics and adjusted R2 values greater than 0.5.
Also, the DW statistic for the individual countries
are better than that of the region as a whole,
suggesting serial correlation is not a problem when
model B is estimated for the countries.
Turning now the individual estimated
coefficients, for the region as a whole, GDP growth
and openness to trade are significant at the 95%
confidence level, political freedom is significant at
the 75% confidence level. For the individual
countries, only political freedom is statistically
significant at the 80% confidence level or better in
the majority of the countries.

Openness to trade is

not significant in any of the individual country
estimates.
The results of the model suggest there is a
positive correlation between the growth of GDP and
being a net exporter of arms in the cases of Eastern
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Europe as a whole, and in East Germany. However, when
model B is applied to Czechoslovakia

(which is the

combination of data from the Czech Republic and
Slovakia after the split) and Hungary, the regression
results indicate a fairly large negative relationship
between the balance of arms trade and GDP growth. It
appears that GDP growth may affect arms trade
differently in different cases.
The same situation occurs when the coefficients
for political freedom are estimated. In all countries
except Romania, the estimated coefficients are
significant at the 80% level or better. For the region
as a whole, along with Czechoslovakia and Poland, the
regression results indicate a positive relationship
between arms trade flow and political freedom,
suggesting the more freedom, the larger the surplus of
arms trade. The opposite result was estimated in the
cases of Bulgaria, East Germany and Poland. These
results suggest there may be other variables that
interact with GDP growth and political freedom to
affect the flow of arms trade.
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Finally, openness to trade is only significant in
the region as a whole. The estimated coefficient is
(-4.22) which suggests the more open Eastern Europe is
to trade, the more likely it is to be a net importer
of arms.
While models of arms trade do help us gain
insight into the military sector of the region and
individual countries, they by no means present the
whole picture. It is important also to look at models
of military expenditures, both in volume and
intensity. Two models of military expenditures are
presented next.
4.3 Model C
As was the case in the two previous models, model
C was tested both with and without dummy variables for
time when estimated for Eastern Europe as a whole.
Once again, the estimated coefficients for these dummy
variables were not shown to be statistically
significant. Table 4 shows the differences in the
estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables,
but does not provide the coefficients for the dummy
variables. These coefficients along with their
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corresponding t-statistics are provided in the
appendix.
Table 3: Model C: Dependent: Variable ME
E.
Region** Region*** Bulgaria Czechs. Germ. Hungary Poland Romania
-0.04*
-0.07* -0.05*
GDPGR
-0.02*
-0.02*
-0.02*
-0.03 -0.24*
(-2.21)
(-2.21)
(-1.69)
(-1.15) (1.44) (-1.74) (-1.55)
(-1.31)
-0.66
LNOPEN
-0.75 -0.33
-0.24 -0.05*
-0.86*
-0.13
-0.86*
(-1.20)
(-0.37)
(-8.65)
(-1.08) (-2.34) (-0.98) (-0.98)
(-1-7)
LNPFI
1.17*
0.98*
0.37*
2.18* 1.67*
0.951.17*
1.55*
(3.04)
(1.42) (6.41)
(8.77)
(7.53)
(1.96) (2.11)
(7.53)
LNNATO
-0.64*
-0.17*
0.41*
-0.08
0.75* 0.38*
-0.16*
-0.78*
(3.41) (2.11)
(1.94)
(-1.25)
(-2.09)
(2.86) (-0.06)
(-2.10)
C
10.40*
6.60*
2.54* 1.47*
10.40*
5.23*
11.20*
10.35*
(3.24)
3.94 (8.54)
(1-34)
23.40
23.40
(6.60) (8.51)
Adj. R2
0.94
0.92
0.95
0.95
0.93
0.97
0.93
0.93
t-statistics are presented in parentheses
* denotes significance at the 0.80 level or better
** regional results with dummies
***results without dummies

Model C is obviously quite strong as a model. For
all of the cases, the adjusted R2 values are all
greater than 0.9, suggesting the model explains over
90% of the variance in military expenditures. All of
the F values are well above the critical value of 3.32
needed for 99% confidence. While the DW statistics
indicate there may be some serial correlation in the
Bulgarian and Romanian estimates, serial correlation
is not a problem in the regional estimates.
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Of all the explanatory variables, political
freedom is the most significant. For every case, the
estimated coefficients on political freedom are
significant at the 80% level or better. All of the
coefficients are positive, suggesting as political
freedom increases, military expenditures will decline.
Recall that a high value for PFI indicates a lower
level of political freedom.
The coefficients are measurements of elasticity,
which is an indication of how sensitive the dependent
variable is to fluctuations in the independent
variable. Any value greater than one is indicative of
a very elastic, or responsive dependent variable.
This suggests political freedom has a very large and
significant effect on military expenditures in all
cases. The only possible exception is the case of
Czechoslovakia, where the coefficient is estimated to
be 0.37.
The coefficients for GDP growth are significant
at the 80% confidence level in all of the countries
except Czechoslovakia. It is significant at the 95%
level for Eastern Europe as a whole. All of the

51

coefficients have negative signs, suggesting that as
GDP growth increases, military expenditures do indeed
fall. However it is important to note that, in most
cases, the coefficients are rather small. The largest
coefficient estimated is for East Germany, with a
value of -0.24.
A new variable, affiliation with NATO was found
to be significant at the 95% level in all cases except
in the region as a whole and in Hungary. In those two
cases, the estimated coefficients were not significant
even at the 80% level of confidence. There is a fairly
noticeable variation between the magnitudes of the
coefficients as well as in their signs. For example,
the Bulgarian case has an estimated coefficient of 0.78 whereas the Hungarian coefficient has an estimate
of 0.75. These varied results suggest the other 3
explanatory variables likely interact with the NATO
variable to affect military expenditures.
Finally, openness to trade is very significant
„for Eastern Europe as a whole, with a t-statistic of
“8.65 and a rather large coefficient of -0.86.
However, the only other case where openness to trade
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is significant is in East Germany. The estimated
coefficient is much smaller in the East German, case
than in the regional case, though. This suggests that
as openness to trade increases in the entire Eastern
European region, that military expenditures will
decline.
All of the results in model C are in accordance
with those hypothesized earlier in this study. The
model does appear to be a very useful and significant
predictor of military expenditures, especially when
applied to Eastern Europe as a whole. While the volume
of military expenditures is certainly a useful piece
of data, it is also important to consider the
intensity of military expenditures. In other words,
how much of GDP is made up of military expenditures. A
final model developed in this study deals with the
intensity of military expenditures.
4.4 Model D
Recall this final model has the intensity of
military expenditures, as defined by military
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, as the dependent
variable. The three explanatory variables are growth
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rate of real GDP, political freedom, and openness to
trade. Once again, the model was estimated for the
region both with and without dummy variables to
account for time. The estimated coefficients on the
dummy variables themselves were not statistically
significant and are available in the appendix.
Table 5: Model D : Dependent Variable INTENSE
E.
Region** Region*** Bulgaria Czechs. Germ. Hungary Poland Romania
GDPGR
-0.02
-0.02*
-0.20*
0.00
-0.03*
-0.03
0.00
-0.02
(-3.03)
(-3.03)
(-2.37) (-0.52) (-1-20) (-0.55)
(-0.81)
(-0.55)
LNOPEN
0.00
0.00
1.10
0.74 10.30
0.35
0.00*
0.37
(1.11)
(-0.10)
(0.00)
(134) (0.70)
(0.64) (0.44)
(120)
LNPFI
0.78*
0.78*
1.07*
0.64*
0.02
0.868 0.97*
0.75*
(13.90)
(14.00)
(4.17)
(3.21) (1.58)
(0.30) (1.60)
(1.70)
C
0.45*
0.45* -942.00
-0.27 -36.00
34.30 -521.00 -115.00
(1.51)
(1.52)
(0.00)
(-0.09) (0.01)
0.23 (0.37)
(0.61)
Adj. R2
.054
0.53
0.84
0.96
0.80
0.79
0.67
0.88
t-statistics are presented in parentheses
* denotes significance at the 0.80 level or better
** regional results with dummies
***results without dummies

Once again, the F statistics for all cases are
larger than the critical values. The adjusted R2
values are also above 0.5 in all cases. Finally, the
DW statistics indicate that serial correlation is not
a problem in any of the cases.
The estimated coefficient for political freedom
appears to be the most statistically significant of
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The four models that were developed and estimated
in this study do provide some valuable insight into
what affects the military situations in Eastern
Europe. All of the models estimated seem to be more
applicable to the region of Eastern Europe as a whole
than to the individual countries. This suggests that
military affairs, such as arms trade issues and
military expenditure issues, tend to be affected more
by regional matters than by country-specific ones.
With the increasing regionalism that is emerging
throughout the globe, this suggestion is not
surprising. The final section of this study will
review the major conclusions reached from this study
as well as policy implications and suggestions for
further study.
5.0 Conclusions
5.1 Findings
The most important finding of this study is the
importance of political freedom. In all four models,
and increase in political freedom was shown to be
associated with a desired trait, i.e. less trade in
arms, lower military expenditures, etc.
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all the explanatory variables. It is significant at
the 80% confidence level in all cases except for the
Czech case. All of the estimated coefficients are at
least 0.64 and are all positive. These results suggest
that as political freedom increases, the intensity of
military expenditures will decline. The larger
coefficients indicate the relationship is an elastic
one.
GDP growth is the next most significant of the
variables.

It is significant at the 95% confidence

level when estimated for the region as well as for
Czechoslovakia. The coefficients are negative, and
rather small, suggesting that as GDP growth increases,
the intensity of military expenditures will decline,
but not a great deal.
Finally, openness to trade is only significant at
the 80% level in the case of Czechoslovakia, however
the estimated coefficient is effectively zero. This
suggests that openness to trade does not have any
statistically significant effect upon the intensity of
military expenditures.
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Openness to trade does also seem to be associated
with a desired trait of lower military expenditures in
Eastern Europe.

Other significant indicators of lower

military expenditures are more political freedoms,
positive GDP growth, and a relationship with NATO.
5.2 Policy Implications
As was mentioned in the beginning of this study,
there are many people who believe the world is on the
brink of another arms race coupled with dangerously
high levels of military spending. While many would
agree with my assertion that the bi-polar balance of
power that existed during the Cold-War era was a far
more stable international system than the unbalanced,
multi-polar world we live in currently.
If a new arms trade were to begin, it is highly
unlikely the world would once again divide itself into
a neatly bipolar international system. At the very
least, the new arms race would likely trigger a tripolar system with the US, Russia, and China all
competing for superiority. A multi-polar system is
inherently unstable, and the instability is more
worrisome when arms stockpiles are on the rise.
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Therefore it is critical to take steps to inhibit the
emergence of another international arms race.
Military expenditures are once again on the rise.
The Regan administration ushered in an era of
astronomically high military expenditures that some
claim had a serious, negative impact upon the economy
of the United States as well as the global economy.
While military expenditures are certainly necessary
and beneficial, it is important to be able to keep
them in check to avoid running unhealthy budget
deficits.
5.3. Suggestions for Future Studies
The weakest model in this study is model D. The
only significant variable in model D is political
freedom. More studies need to be done to find out what
other variables influence the intensity of military
expenditures.
Further research also needs to be done on the
role played by NATO with regard to military
expenditures. Recall that the estimated coefficients
for NATO in the model of military expenditures took on
both negative and positive values. It would be
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interesting to further divide the NATO variable into
the two strategic regions that NATO is developing in
Eastern Europe. A similar tiered system was also
present in the Warsaw Pact. It would be very
interesting to divide the data into these tiers and
see what results are generated.
Like the NATO coefficients, the estimated
coefficient for political freedom with regard to the
direction of arms trade also took on both negative and
positive values. More study needs to be done to
determine under what circumstances do these
coefficients take on negative and positive values.
All of the models discussed throughout this study
are more applicable to Eastern Europe as a whole, as
opposed to the individual countries that constitute
Eastern Europe for the purpose of this study. The
strongest of these four models is model C. It would be
interesting to see if the highly significant results
estimated for this model in the case of Eastern Europe
would also be generated for other regions of the
world.

59

Appendix: Estimated Coefficients for Dummy Variables

DUM70
DUM71
UUM72
DUM73
DUM74
DUM75
DUM76
DUM77
DUM78
DUM79
DUM80
DUM81
DUM82
DUM83
DUM84
DUM85
DUM86
DUM87
DUM88
DUM89

Model A
-0.16
(-0.19)
-0.14
(-0.26)
-0.46
(-0.1)
0.08
(0.46)
-0.03
(-0.06)
-0.03
(-0.06)
-0.26
(-0.57)
-0.37
(-0.78)
-0.34
(-0.74)
-0.6
(-0-13)
-.045
(-0.09)
-0.3
(-0.06)
0.13
(0.6)
-0.17
(-0.61)
-0.14
(-0.3)
0.4
(0.87)
0.58
(1.2)
0.18
(0.38)
0
(0.01)
-0.55
(-1.18)

Model B Model C Model D
-0.12
-502
0.1
(0.41)
(-0.08)
(-0.06)
-0.05
-513
0.09
(0.37)
(-0.12)
(-0.31)
0.08
0.09
-730
(0.45)
(-0.19)
(0.36)
-1148
0.10)
0.06
(0.33)
(0.36)
(-0.28)
-0.12
-1023
0.11
(0.63)
(0.39)
(-0.25)
-0.12
0.12
-935
(-0.63)
(-0.22)
(0.38)
1014
0.12
0.15
(0-37)
(0.08)
(-0.2)
0.12
-0.18
-895
(0.37)
(-0.09)
(-0.22)
-0.23
-791
0.13
(0.37)
(-0.19)
(-0.11)
-0.27
0.13
-860
(-0.14)
(0.37)
(-0.21)
0.13
-0.26
-743
(0.37)
(-0.18)
(-0.13)
0.14
-561
-0.23
(-0.12)
(-0.14)
(0.39)
1338
0.14
-0.18
(-0.09)
(0.33)
(0.4)
-467
-0.13
0.15
(-0.12)
(0.44)
(-0.63)
-253
0.15
-0.18
(-0.62)
(0.44)
(0.09)
-0.04
-566
0.16
(-0.24)
(-0.14)
(0.49)
0.17
0.29
-936
(-0.23)
(0.49)
(0.15)
0.27
-589
0.17
(0.14)
(-0.15)
(0.53)
0.17
-714
0.23
(0.55)
(0.12)
(-0.18)
0.4
0.18
-718*
(0.56)
(0.19)
(-1.69)
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A p p e n d ix C o n tin u e d
DUM90
DUM91
DUM92
DUM93
DUM94
DUM95
DUM96
DUM97
DUM98

0.23
(0.49)
-0.16
(-0.24)
-0.18
(0.37)
-0.14
(-0.27)
0.2
(0.4)
-0.13
(-0.29)
-0.03
(-0.07)

1183
(-0.25)
-613
(-0.13)
-446
(-0.01)
-503
(-1-15)
-17.7
(-0.04)
-6.87
(-0.00)
-96
(-0.23)

0.14
(0.40)
0.10
(0.30)
0.06
(0.18)
0.00
(0.06)
0.03
(0.11)
0.42
(0-15)
0.36
(0.15)
0.05
(0.24)
0.22
(0.14)

0.59
(0.25)
-0.03
(-0.16)
-0.03
(-0.16)
-0.13
(-0.60)
-0.29
(-1.38)
-0.20
(-0.10)
-0.33
(-0.16)
-0.38
(0.18)
-0.40
(-0.19)
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